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Scale-free networks resistant to intentional attacks
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PACS 89.75.Da – Systems obeying scaling laws
PACS 87.23.Ge – Dynamics of social systems
Abstract. - We study the detailed mechanism of the failure of scale-free networks under inten-
tional attacks. Although it is generally accepted that such networks are very sensitive to targeted
attacks, we show that for a particular type of structure such networks surprisingly remain very
robust even under removal of a large fraction of their nodes, which in some cases can be up to 70%.
The degree distribution P (k) of these structures is such that for small values of the degree k the
distribution is constant with k, up to a critical value kc, and thereafter it decays with k with the
usual power law. We describe in detail a model for such a scale-free network with this modified
degree distribution, and we show both analytically and via simulations, that this model can ade-
quately describe all the features and breakdown characteristics of these attacks. We have found
several experimental networks with such features, such as for example the IMDB actors collabo-
ration network or the citations network, whose resilience to attacks can be accurately described
by our model.
A large number of diverse systems in society, nature
and technology can be described by the concept of a net-
work [1, 2]. In a network the form of inter-relations be-
tween the system parts determines many structural and
dynamic properties of the system. One such property that
has received considerable attention is the robustness of a
network under intentional attack [3, 4]. In the course of
such an attack nodes of the network are removed in de-
creasing order of their degree k (number of connections to
other nodes). This is considered to be the most harmful
type of attack on a network, since the removal of the hubs
results in the largest possible damage. In fact, this vul-
nerability of the networks to attacks has been described as
their Achilles’ heel [3], because it is generally accepted that
scale-free networks are easily destroyed under intentional
attacks. This removal process has many and important
implications, since depending on the application, it may
describe the resilience of a network, such as the Internet,
or the required number of vaccinations for immunization
considerations, etc.
For a scale-free network, where the probability that a
node has a given number of links decays as a power-law,
it has been shown that the critical percentage pc of re-
moved nodes that results in network disintegration is very
low (of the order of a few percent) [4, 5]. It is, thus, a
well-established fact, supported by exact analytic results
and simulations of attacks on model and real-life networks,
that a scale-free network is very vulnerable to intentional
attacks (where pc is close to 0), although the same network
is extremely robust under random node failures (where
pc ≃ 1) [6].
In this Letter we show that there exists a large class
of networks that are usually found in nature and soci-
ety and have already been characterized as scale-free, but
nevertheless remain robust against removal of the most
connected nodes. We first present the results for real-life
networks and then introduce a modified version for the
degree distribution of scale-free networks, for which our
analytic and simulation treatment support these findings.
To demonstrate this issue we performed intentional at-
tacks and random nodes removal to many different real-
life networks. The critical point was calculated via two
distinct methods. In the first method, during the re-
moval process we monitored the value of the parameter
κ ≡ 〈k2〉/〈k〉, where κ is the connectivity parameter, and
which has been shown to be a measure of the global net-
work connectivity [6,7]. A value of κ < 2 signifies the dis-
integration of a network into isolated clusters. The second
method was a direct measurement of the largest cluster
size. The value of pc was identified as the one where this
size assumes for the first time a value close to zero. The
two methods coincide only when the network is ‘random’
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Fig. 1: Percentage of nodes, P∞(p), belonging to the largest
cluster after removal of a fraction p of nodes, as a function of
p. The results correspond to intentional attacks on a number
of different networks (shown in the plot).
and uncorrelated, in the sense that there is no inherent
organization (or equivalently degree-degree correlations)
in the network. In a clustered network, though, where
these correlations are present, such as the IMDB actors
network, the two methods give different results (pc = 0.96
with the first method, but pc = 0.62 with the second).
Here, we considered the pc value derived by the largest
cluster size calculation. The corresponding results for the
fraction of nodes P∞(p) that belong to the largest clus-
ter of the network during an intentional attack are shown
in Fig. 1, as a function of the percentage p of removed
nodes. While the size of the spanning cluster falls rapidly
in most cases (similarly to a model random network) there
are some systems where this size remains significant even
for larger values of p.
In Table 1 we summarize the numerical results we ob-
tained for the critical threshold pc of the networks pre-
sented in Fig. 1. Although many of these systems be-
have in a similar way to the configuration model network,
there is a number of networks, such as actors collabora-
tion and science citations, where the intentional attack
requires removal of a considerable portion of the network
nodes, which is of the order of 65%. In order to out-
line the common feature of these networks, in Fig. 2 we
present their degree distribution. These distributions have
a flat or rising part at low-degree nodes and only after a
threshold value the distribution decays as a power-law.
We will show that this feature alone is enough to render
a network resistant to attacks, while the resilience to ran-
dom node removal remains intact, as we have verified with
simulations that show that in this case the critical thresh-
old remains the same as in simple scale-free networks, i.e.
pc → 1.
The analytical considerations in the current work ap-
ply to simple and random networks, where connections
between nodes are completely random and the network
does not include any self-loops or multiple links between
Table 1: Critical fraction pc for intentional attacks and random
removal on different networks.
Network Intentional Random
Configuration model (γ = 2.5) 0.055 0.99
Online community1 0.04 0.90
WWW (nd.edu)2 0.10 0.99
IMDB actors collaboration2 0.62 0.99
HEP-TH arxiv.org citations3 0.68 0.98
a(pussokram.com) Data described in Ref. [8].
bhttp://www.nd.edu/∼networks/resources.htm
chttp://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/data/hep-th/hep-
th.htm
two nodes. The construction of a network for our numer-
ical calculations follows a slightly modified version of the
configuration model. We start with N unconnected nodes
and to each node i we assign a degree ki from a given dis-
tribution P (k), so that each node has initially a number
of unconnected links. We randomly choose two of these
unconnected links. If these links belong to the same node
or they belong to two nodes that are already connected
we ignore this selection and randomly choose two other
unconnected links. Otherwise, we establish a connection
between these two nodes. We repeat this procedure un-
til all nodes have reached their pre-assigned connectivity.
The use of this method leads to a simple network (i.e. one
without self-loops and multiple links) where the degree
distribution follows the pre-defined P (k) function. We do
not impose any upper cutoff for this distribution, so that
correlations between degrees are similar to those of a net-
work with completely random connections and no upper
cutoff.
We consider networks whose degree distribution is uni-
form for all k values up to a threshold value kc, while for
larger k values it decays as a power law k−γ , where γ is a
parameter with typical values in the range 2-4. The exact
form of the distribution, also plotted in Fig. 2 for kc = 50
and γ = 2.5, is
P (k) =
{
A 1 < k < kc
Bk−γ k ≥ kc
, (1)
where the values for the A and B constants are
A =
γ − 1
kcγ − γ + 1
, B = kγcA . (2)
These values are derived by the requirement that the dis-
tribution is properly normalized and continuous. The frac-
tion of the nodes that belong to the scale-free part of the
distribution (i.e. nodes with k > kc) is shown in the in-
set of Fig. 2 for different values of kc as a function of γ.
We can conclude that the network retains a substantial
scale-free character in practically all cases studied (note
also that even for pure scale-free networks a large portion
of the nodes has k = 1).
We calculate the critical threshold pc for such a net-
work based on ideas introduced by Cohen et al [4] and
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Fig. 2: Degree distributions for IMDB actors (filled symbols)
and HEP citations (open symbols). The solid line represents
a typical degree distribution (Eq. 1) that we used as a model.
Inset: Percentage of nodes belonging to the scale-free part of
the distribution as a function of γ. From top to bottom: kc =2,
3, 5, 10, and 50.
Dorogovtsev and Mendes [9]. We employ a continuum
approximation where the degree of a node is treated as
a continuous variable. Nodes are removed according to
their initial degree, so that the intentional attack finally
results in the disruption of the network. We consider that
the degrees of the nodes for the network at criticality, i.e.
just before disruption, are given by the parameter k˜, with
corresponding averages
〈k˜〉 =
∫ K˜
1
kP (k)dk , 〈k˜2〉 =
∫ K˜
1
k2P (k)dk . (3)
The effect of an intentional attack is to remove all nodes
of a network whose degree is larger than a cutoff value K˜,
i.e. k˜ ∈ [1, K˜]. This also implies that pc equals
pc = 1−
∫ K˜
1
P (k)dk =
∫
∞
K˜
P (k)dk , (4)
where the first form is simpler to compute when K˜ < kc
and the second form when K˜ > kc. At the same time,
removal of a node leads to removing all its links to other
nodes. We consider random networks with no correlations
in the nodes connections, which means that a removal of
a node results in removal of random links with probability
p˜ =
∫
∞
K˜ kP (k)dk∫
∞
1
kP (k)dk
= 1−
〈k˜〉
〈k〉
. (5)
It has been shown [6, 7] that a random network loses
its large-scale connectivity after the removal of a critical
fraction pc of nodes, according to
pc = 1−
1
κ− 1
, (6)
where κ ≡ 〈k2〉/〈k〉. This equation has been shown in
Ref. [4] to be valid for removal of either nodes or links.
As explained in detail there, an intentional attack leads
to the equivalent of a scale-free network with upper cutoff
K˜ where a random fraction p˜ of nodes has been removed.
Because of the random character of the network all the
links have the same probability of being removed, and this
results to a new degree disribution P˜ (k). This fact is then
used to prove Eq. (6). We can then use this equation for
the network resulting after the attack, by substituting a)
pc with p˜ from Eq. 5 and b) κ = 〈k˜
2〉/〈k˜〉. After a few
trivial steps Eq. 6 becomes
〈k˜2〉 − 〈k˜〉 = 〈k〉 . (7)
This formula, which is exact, has been already proven in
Refs. [4, 9].
In order to use Eq. 7 we need to know whether the
value of K˜ is larger or smaller than the threshold value
of the distribution kc, so we consider each case separately.
Calculation of the integrals involved yields
〈k˜〉 =
{
A
2 (K˜
2 − 1) K˜ < kc
A
2 (k
2
c − 1) +
B
γ−2(k
2−γ
c − K˜
2−γ) K˜ > kc
,
(8)
and
〈k˜2〉 =
{
A
3 (K˜
3 − 1) K˜ < kc
A
3 (k
3
c − 1) +
B
γ−3(k
3−γ
c − K˜
3−γ) K˜ > kc
.
(9)
The average value of the initial degree distribution P (k)
(Eq. 1) can be approximated with the assumption that
kmax = ∞. However, for low γ values this assumption
does not work well and for a finite-size network we should
compute the integral up to the maximum value kmax = K,
which can be found from the relation
∫
∞
kmax
P (k) = 1/N ,
and is given in our case by K = ((γ − 1)/BN)1/(1−γ).
This results in a correction to the average value of the
unperturbed distribution, which finally becomes
〈k〉 =
A
2
(k2c−1)+
B
γ − 2
k2−γc −
B
γ − 2
(
γ − 1
BN
) γ−2
γ−1
. (10)
The third term is important only for finite-size networks
and vanishes as N →∞.
Combining Eqs. (7)-(10) we get
2K˜3 − 3K˜2 =
3γk2
c
−4γ+8
γ−2 −
6kγ
c
γ−2
(
γ−1
BN
) γ−2
γ−1 K˜ < kc
kc
γ−3
(
K˜
kc
)3−γ
− 1γ−2
(
K˜
kc
)2−γ
=
γkc
3(γ−3) −
γ
γ−2 +
2
3k2
c
+
kγ−2
c
γ−2
(
γ−1
BN
) γ−2
γ−1 K˜ > kc
.
(11)
Solving the above equations for kc = K˜ we can find the γ
value for which the lowest degree K˜ of the nodes that need
to be removed switches from K˜ > kc to K˜ < kc. This γ
value is
γ =
2k3c − 3k
2
c + 4
k3 − 3k2 + 2
. (12)
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Fig. 3: Critical fraction pc of removed nodes for networks that
undergo an intentional attack, as a function of the exponent γ.
From top to bottom: kc = 50, 20, 10, 5, 4, 3, 2 and 1. Thick
lines represent the infinite-size numerical solution of Eqs. 11
and 13, dashed lines represent the same solution for N = 106,
and filled symbols are simulation results on a network of size
N = 106 nodes. The bottom curve for kc = 1 is identical to
the solution for pure scale-free networks (Ref. [4]) The empty
circles denote the solution of Eq. 12, where the value of K˜
switches from K˜ > kc to K˜ < kc.
We can now compute the value of K˜ from Eq. 11 and
substitute it to Eq. 4, which can also be written as
pc =
{
kcγ−K˜(γ−1)
kcγ−γ+1
K˜ < kc
A
3 (k
3
c − 1) +
B
γ−3(k
3−γ
c − K˜
3−γ) K˜ > kc
.
(13)
The numerical solution of Eqs. 11 and 13 is shown in
Fig. 3 as a function of γ for different values of the thresh-
old value kc. In the same figure we also plot results of
simulations on networks that were created with the con-
figuration model. The size of these networks was N = 106
nodes and their degree distribution obeys Eq. 1. During
the attack process we removed nodes in decreasing order
of their degree and monitored continuously the value of
κ until it became less than 2. The percentage of the re-
moved nodes up to that point corresponds to the critical
value pc. Note that this method does not have the prob-
lems described above, since it is applied to the randomized
networks created via the configuration model. We verified
this statement by also comparing to the results from the
largest cluster size method.
Our results for kc = 1 coincide with the solution pro-
vided in Ref. [4], as can also be seen numerically from
Eqs. 11 and 13. Comparison of the curves in Fig. 3 for
kc > 1 to the intentional attack on regular scale-free net-
works shows a dramatic increase in the value of pc, over
the entire γ range. As the threshold value kc increases,
the stability of the network is further enhanced. Even for
kc = 2 we observe a significant influence in the resilience
of the network, where pc is usually more than two times
larger than for the case of kc = 1. For kc = 5 the crit-
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Fig. 4: Variation of the critical threshold pc with the network
size N for different values of γ and kc. The effect of the size on
the threshold is in general not significant, with small exceptions
for γ values close to 2.
ical fraction is already above 30%, while when kc = 10
the value of pc lies in the range of 50%. For even larger
values, such as kc = 50 which as can be seen in Fig. 1
is not unusual for real-world networks, the networks ex-
hibit a remarkable resilience to intentional attacks, with
a pc value close to 70%. Notice here, that the variation
of pc for γ > 2.5 is almost independent of γ. Thus, the
important part of the distribution for robustness is the
low-degree part and in our model networks its extent in
the k-range. On the contrary, an exponent γ > 2.5 for the
decaying part does not really influence the attack result.
As the value of γ approaches 2, though, the decrease in
the value of pc is quite sharp, with the infinite-size result
pc = 0 for γ = 2. For finite size networks this decrease is
much slower and the critical threshold remains significant.
The stability of the solution with respect to the network
size N is shown in Fig. 4. The value of pc is practically
not influenced by N when γ is not close to γ = 2, such as
γ = 2.5 or larger. For these smaller γ values the critical
threshold exhibits larger variations, such as in the case of
γ = 2.1 presented in the plot. Even in this case, though,
when the network size becomes larger than a moderate size
of N ∼ 104 then the critical threshold remains practically
constant.
The explanation behind the enhanced stability can be
largely attributed to the increasing average number of con-
nections per node when the kc value increases. Although
a large value for 〈k〉 means obviously an enhanced ro-
bustness for the network, we also find that the network
is resilient even for very small kc values. Indeed, in real
networks it is usually not easy to clarify the exact behav-
ior of the degree distribution at very small degrees, and a
difference between kc = 1 and kc = 2 or 3 can easily be
unnoticed.
These findings suggest a structure that is very robust
against both random failures and targeted attacks. This
p-4
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optimization is desirable in most cases and the structure
itself, which as we have seen emerges naturally in many
instances, may be used to efficiently protect a network
against most attacks. On the contrary, for immunization
purposes, the existence of such networks may present dif-
ficulties for efficient strategies. Even if global knowledge
of the entire network structure is available, the required
number of vaccinations remains very high. In such a case,
it is very important to acquire as accurate information
on the network structure as possible, and especially for
the low-degree part, because a simple power-law decay of
the degree distribution over a large degree range does not
guarantee efficient immunization, if at small values of the
degree this power-law decay is not obeyed.
A study for networks that offer better resilience to at-
tacks than simple scale-free networks has been performed
in Ref. [10]. The authors find that the optimal network de-
sign for optimization against both random and intentional
attack is one where all nodes have the same degree k1, ex-
cept for a ‘central’ node with a large degree k2 ∼ N
2/3.
That work, though, has a different scope than ours since
the authors kept in all instances the average value 〈k〉 con-
stant, while in our work this average value is modified as
we modify kc.
In summary, we have studied intentional attacks on net-
works whose distribution is uniform for low degrees k and
decays as a power law for larger k. Such a structure is
very robust against both random and intentional attacks,
and outlines the importance of the low-degree nodes in
the connectivity of the structure. Although hubs connect
a large part of the network, it is true that they will be
unavoidably removed sooner or later, depending on the
removal strategy. However, it seems that the form of the
distribution at low degrees is equally or more important
than the existence of the hubs and may render a network
vulnerable or stable against intentional attacks.
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